BY CALLUM MCCADDEN WORDS: 2047
It has been a few years since I originally wrote this piece. It was created and researched in 2018 as part of my university degree. I’m sad to report after a quick google it appears that the situation has not much improved, with foreign trawlers still engaging in illegal activities along this coast line.
I will note here that upon re-reading this paper I changed a few words and sentences about to combat an overarching tone which could border on white savourism. As it stands I think the piece works, but I’m open to critique on this. What I am trying to achieve is placing the fault upon the EU, South Korea and China. With that said I recognise the piece has a strong moralistic tone, for example using Sierra Leonne as an example – however I do think the increased piracy during this particular country’s crisis, and the fact I had never heard of this before speaks volumes to Western indifference.
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West African fishing grounds exist in a state of neo-colonial plunder. This essay will argue that incursions of third-party countries fishing in the waters of West Africa, either legally or illegally, constitute an unfair imperial practice that is morally reprehensible in the 21st century. The situation in Sub-Saharan West African fisheries is dire as fish stocks have become overexploited as they have been harvested at unsustainable levels (Antonova, 2016; Doumbouya et al., 2017). In the exploited waters of these developing and predominately poor nations, trawlers from the European Union, South Korea and China operate (EJF, 2009, Doumbouya et al., 2017; Monbiot, 2013). This essay will operationalise Val Plumwood’s (2008) ‘shadow places’, arguing that West African fisheries are a place of material support for the (conceptual) West where they export fish to the European Union (EU), South Korea and China yet receive little in return. It will argue that this material support is unfairly compensated for with legal practices, and outright stolen through Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IUU) which shall be referred to as piracy, a crime the West is rarely accused of.
The conceptual framework of this essay will be Plumwood’s (2008) shadow places, underlined with Adger’s (2006) and Pelling’s (2003) understandings of vulnerability, set up in a post-colonial framework. Plumwood (2008) argued that a better ‘ecological consciousness’ is needed for the earth, where attention to place is not an arbitrary chosen ‘my place’, such as your own nation state, but rather attention should be given to all places which materially support you. In the globalised world of the 21st century, individuals are seldom supported by their own nations, drawing resources across the globe from the Chinese smartphones in their pockets to the West African fish on their plates. This essay will argue it is this place indifference that has led to the piracy of West African waters. This situation is important. It has created a situation of vulnerability for West Africans, specifically their food security. This vulnerability is physically true in the region, but it doesn’t have to be and has been socially caused (Adger, 2006). The social cause is this piracy, which acts as a ‘chronic stressor’ not just for regional cities, but for the entire region (Pelling, 2003). Finally, it is worth noting that this essay has drawn significantly from the work of a non-academic paper (EJF, 2009). Unironically this issue has received little attention in academia, particularly geography. The credibility of the report used here, by the Environmental Justice Foundation, is strong considering the organisation is referenced in papers such as Doumbouya et al. (2017).
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing:
The occurrence of IUU in West Africa waters is morally bankrupt as it is stealing from those unable to defend themselves. IUU constitutes a number of activities from outright theft in countries unable to guard their waters (Illegal), taking advantage of non-managed areas (Unregulated), or deceiving authorities by having a literal layer of an allowed fish on top of a prohibited species to mask what the boat has actually caught for example (Unreported). Countries in this area are often unable to patrol their Exclusive Economic Zone’s (EEZs – the coastal area of which a nation has the exclusive right to control resources) due to budgetary constraints as these countries are relatively poor, and navies are very expensive (Figure 1 -Belhabib et al., 2015; Doumbouya et al., 2017). The link to piracy is direct and it has been observed that the countries in the area that can afford to patrol their waters, suffer less from this piracy (Doumbouya et al., 2017). This is predatory behaviour, and deserves international condemnation as opposed to current state of apathy from international actors, particularly the European Union (Monbiot, 2013; Antonova, 2016). A telling example is the case of Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone is last in the United Nation’s Human Development Index, a vulnerable post-conflict state with large amounts of poverty and undernourishment (EJF, 2009). During the Sierra Leone’s devastating civil war in the 1990s, and as the country suffered from the Ebola crisis in 2014, IUU fishing in the country’s EEZ increased (Doumbouya et al., 2017; EJF, 2009). This is a prime example of the perversity of piracy being practiced in these waters; an assault on the weakened which must be condemned. Sierra Leone is not an isolated example, it is estimated that up to 40% of fish caught in the West African region is done so illegally, alarming levels indicating that the situation is both a crisis and a plunder (Doumbouya et al., 2017).
IUU is particularly heinous in West African waters because it creates a situation of food insecurity. A geographic lens demands not just moral cries, but analysis of the extent of issues across space and place. The piracy of fish in West Africa creates food insecurity because of the dependence on fishing for the local population(s). In Sierra Leone, fish constitute 80 per cent of animal protein (EJF, 2009). In Senegal, 75% (Antonova, 2016). This is a common trend across the region due to the high fertility of the ocean in the region (Ndiaye, 2011; Doumbouya et al. 2017), which is further exacerbated by inland infertility due to the arid Sahel landscape for certain countries such as Mauritania and Senegal. In this sense the dependency on fishing resources is well-established. This pirate fishing threatens these ecosystems on which West African nations rely, and hence the food produced from it. Methods employed, particularly trawling, are destructive and destroy reproductive abilities of marine ecosystems by killing infantile fish as well as ripping up production habitats and reducing biodiversity (Srinivasan et al., 2010; Ndiaye, 2011; Monbiot, 2013). This situation is precarious for West Africans as distant water fleets from the EU and Asia act as a chronic stressor, increasing food insecurity through overexploitation – a vulnerability that needs addressed sooner than later to avoid further undernourishment or a food crisis (Pelling, 2003; Adger, 2006). In this sense, West African nations are being made vulnerable for the seafood palates of the West, whom have already overexploited their own waters such as the case of the EU which now imports 70% of seafood from out with European waters (Belhabib, 2015). The EU (along with other western powers, predominantly China and South Korea) now exploit these West African nations as shadow places, unknown to the western consumer (Plumwood, 2008; Belhabib, Sumaila & Pauly, 2015). The difference between the Western consumer and the West African consumer is that the Western consumer is not dependent on fish as a primary protein, having the financial capital to change diets with relative ease, a luxury dependent West African fishing communities cannot afford.
Finally, it is pertinent to note that fish piracy is having an adverse economic impact on the countries in the region. Foremost pirate fishing is damaging economies in the area by underreporting, using prohibited gear, fishing in prohibited areas and fishing without a licence (Doumbouya et al., 2017). The impact of IUU activities is estimated to cost approximately $2.3 billion annually across the coastline from Mauritania to Sierra Leone (Doumbouya et al., 2017). To frame this, only $29 million was collected in fines via policing in these waters during the whole period 2009-2016. It is thus evident, the extent of piracy in West African waters is enormous, hitting fishermen whom are often poor themselves the most (Béné, 2003). To compound this problem, pirate fishing vessels have been documented being aggressive towards local artisanal fishermen, destroying fishing gear and ramming boats which take extensively long periods to replace on their low incomes (EJF, 2009: 14; Ndiaye, 2011). Fishermen with remaining boats and gear can be left wading through waters of floating dead fish, a result of the extreme amounts of ‘bycatch’ being thrown overboard, unwanted by commercial interests (Ndiaye, 2011; EJF, 2009). It is estimated that up to 90% of fish caught may be discarded in this way, left to wash up on the shores of undernourished and underdeveloped nations (Ndiaye, 2011). Through this lost commercial potential of their marine resources, the development of these West African nations is stifled, which further reinforces their inability to police their waters.
Legal fishing:
Fishing arranged legally between distant fishing nations and local West African nations is unfair at best, deceitful and exploitative at worst. At the macro level, Antonova (2016) has explored the unequal EU-Senegal ‘Sustainable Fishing Partnership Agreement’ (SFA). Antonova (2016) argues that although the EU has positioned itself normatively as a beacon of sustainability, its SFA with Senegal contradicts its normative position. Antonova (2016) illustrates that the SFA provides new waters for European trawlers in exchange for cash. As a result Senegal’s waters have become overexploited, with little financial gain for the country (Antonova, 2016). This could be attributed to short-termism on behalf of the Senegalese government, however Antonava chooses instead to highlight the power imbalance between the EU and Senegal as well as the hypocrisy of the EU’s proposed sustainable norms on one hand and their actions on another. In this sense the EU is paying cash for fish, no matter the degradation of the resource. To Alder (2004: 156) these unfair agreements result from ‘colonial ties’ which structured and framed the fishing relationships that were available to post-independent West African states. Financially these agreements don’t work in the favour of African states, with the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations estimating if fish caught by foreign nations was instead domestically caught it would ‘generate an additional value of US$3.3 billion, which is eight times higher than the current US$0.4 billion African countries earn from fisheries agreements.’ (FAO, 2014). To the EU this agreement is beneficial, going so far as to provide subsidies for European fishermen to fish in these waters (Monbiot, 2013; Antonova, 2016). Exploitation by larger nations has a long history in West Africa, and I posit alongside Alder (2004) that this colonial history as reason behind the EU’s wilful ignorance of the problem.
At the micro level legal fishing also exists in an exploitative manner in these waters. It is of particular note that fishing vessels operating illegally in West African waters often have full legal hygiene certification by the European Union’s Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection of the European Commission (DG Sanco)(EJF, 2009). This means the catch of these ships is of a certified quality to be consumed in the European Union, regardless of the means of procurement (EJF, 2009). DG Sanco should work with DG Mare (The European Union’s Directorate-General of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries – responsible for IUU) but does not (EJF, 2009). This leaves a situation where uninspected, often unsanitary ships, operate illegally in West African waters but carry the legal certification for European Union export (EJF, 2009). Finally, the deceitful tactic of transhipment is prevalent in the region, allowing illegal fishing to hide under a façade of legal operations. During this process ships operating illegally will transfer their loads to licenced ships. In this manner fishing operations will only need one licence, and one EU hygiene certification (EJF, 2009; Ndiaye, 2011). It is these operational arrangements that allow vessels to conduct illegal activities yet appear as legal and licenced operators.
Conclusions:
The practice of piracy in West African waters, legal or illegal, exists in an international vacuum of responsibility. It is undeniable that the opportunity is created from the failure of the domestic nation states to protect their own waters. As such it is no surprise that Doumbouya et al. (2017) find that states who impose strong monitoring, control and surveillance with strong punishments for offenders have the least amount of fish piracy in their waters. However, this must be understood in context. The states in question are poor and vulnerable. The powers practicing extractivism in their waters are not. To crack down on this piracy in West African waters we must go beyond recommendations of better governance on behalf of West African states. Instead, as done so briefly here, the exploitative post-colonial relationships existing between Western fishing states and West African fish-providing states must be explored and the neo-colonial plunder must cease. To do so relevant powers such as the European Union, South Korea and China must take responsibility for their merchant fishing vessels operating in the region. To pressure them, the debate must shine light onto this shadow place, exposing the literal thieves in the night.
Figure 1: West African Exclusive Economic Zones included for reference from: Belhabib, D., et al., 2015. Euros vs. Yuan: Comparing European and Chinese Fishing Access in West Africa – Scientific Figure on ResearchGate. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/Exclusive-Economic-Zone-waters-of-the-West-African-countries-considered-here-also_fig1_274385630 [accessed 3 Nov, 2018]
Reference List:
Alder, J. & Sumaila, U.R., 2004. Western Africa: A Fish Basket of Europe Past and Present. The Journal of Environment & Development, 13(2), pp.156–178
Antonova, A., 2016. The rhetoric of “responsible fishing”: Notions of human rights and sustainability in the European Union’s bilateral fishing agreements with developing states. , pp.77–84. ISSN 0308–597X
Belhabib, D., et al., 2015. Euros vs. Yuan: Comparing European and Chinese Fishing Access in West Africa – Scientific Figure on ResearchGate. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/Exclusive-Economic-Zone-waters-of-the-West-African-countries-considered-here-also_fig1_274385630 [accessed 3 Nov, 2018]
Belhabib, D., Sumaila, U.R. & Pauly, D., 2015. Feeding the poor: Contribution of West African fisheries to employment and food securitbey. Ocean and Coastal Management, 111, p.72.
Béné, C., 2003. When Fishery Rhymes with Poverty: A First Step Beyond the Old Paradigm on Poverty in Small-Scale Fisheries. World Development, 31(6), pp.949–975.
Doumbouya, A. et al., 2017. Assessing the Effectiveness of Monitoring Control and Surveillance of Illegal Fishing: The Case of West Africa. Frontiers in Marine Science, 4,
EJF, 2009. Dirty Fish – How EU Hygiene Standards facilitates illegal fishing in West Africa. Environmental Justice Foundation: London. Available: https://ejfoundation.org/resources/downloads/report-dirty-fish.pdf [Accessed: 03/11/2018]
Graaf G. & Garibaldi, L. 2014. The Value of African Fisheries. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rome.
Monbiot, G. 2013. Feral: Rewilding the Land, Sea and Human Life. London: Penguin
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Plumwood, V. 2008. Shadow Places and the Politics of Dwelling. Ecological Humanities, Issue 44, March
Srinivasan, U.T., et al. 2010. Food security implications of global marine catch losses due to overfishing. Journal of Bioeconomics. 12: 183